Before the Sirens

Why Addressing Psychosocial Hazards Before an Incident Determines What the World Learns After One

Introduction: The Moment Before the Moment

Every incident, emergency, or disaster unfolds along two timelines. The first is the one the public sees: the moment something goes wrong, the call for help, the activation of emergency systems, the rush of responders, and the cascade of consequences. This potentially life-threatening timeline dominates news cycles and social media commentary.

But there is another timeline, longer, quieter, and far more consequential. It is the timeline of exposure to conditions, decisions, pressures, and environments that shape how people behave, how teams function, and how organizations respond. This sequence of consequences is the timeline of psychosocial hazards, described by the World Health Organization (2022) as organizational and social factors that influence mental health, stress, and performance.

Psychosocial hazards, as I define them, are factors perceived or experienced as so threatening that exposure to them influences a person’s behavior. This definition centers on the worker’s lived experience rather than the organization’s intent. It acknowledges that harm begins long before a physical injury, operational failure, or catastrophic event. And it recognizes that hazards such as role conflict, excessive workload, fear, harassment, lack of support, poor communication, and discrimination shape the conditions that make incidents more likely and responses less effective (ILO, 2020; Sauter et al., 1990).

The public rarely sees this timeline.
But they feel its consequences.

This reality became painfully clear in the aftermath of the recent aircraft–fire truck collision at LaGuardia Airport. This tragedy immediately triggered the familiar cycle of speculation, accusation, and blame.

A Crash at LaGuardia and the Predictable Blame Cycle

When the aircraft and fire truck collided at New York’s LaGuardia Airport, public conversation shifted instantly to the question of fault. Within minutes, the predictable pattern emerged. Some blamed the air traffic controllers, assuming a clearance error. Others blamed the pilots, suggesting miscommunication. Still others blamed the firefighters, questioning why an emergency vehicle was positioned there.

This instinct to assign blame is deeply human. As Dekker (2014) notes, people tend to focus on the last person who touched the system because it provides a simple, emotionally satisfying explanation. But the systems that shaped the conditions long before the crash rarely receive equal scrutiny.

And in the case of LaGuardia, those systemic concerns were not hypothetical. They were documented, repeated, and publicly available.

Documented Safety Concerns at LaGuardia Before the Crash

In early 2025, CNN conducted a review of two years of NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) reports filed by pilots operating at LaGuardia. These confidential, voluntary reports, widely regarded as the aviation industry’s most candid source of hazard intelligence, revealed a pattern of miscommunication, controller workload, and operational pressure that aligns directly with the definition of psychosocial hazards.

Pilot complaints about miscommunication and rushed operations

Pilots repeatedly reported that LaGuardia’s operational tempo had become unsafe. One pilot wrote:

“Please do something… The pace of operations is building in LGA. The controllers are pushing the line.”
(CNN analysis of ASRS reports, 2025)

Another pilot described receiving conflicting instructions from different controllers within seconds of each other, an example of poor communication and role conflict, both recognized psychosocial hazards under ISO 45003.

These reports reflect perceived threat, confusion, and fear of error, all of which influence behavior and decision‑making.

Near‑miss incidents linked to ATC errors

CNN’s review identified multiple near‑collisions at LaGuardia in the months leading up to the crash:

• Incorrect instructions from ATC caused a near‑miss in December 2024

• A July 2024 incident in which a plane was cleared to cross a runway while another aircraft was landing

• A taxiway collision between two Delta aircraft that sent one person to the hospital

These events were attributed to controller missteps, communication breakdowns, and high workload, all classic psychosocial hazards that degrade performance (FAA, 2026; Reason, 1997).

Chronic understaffing and fatigue among controllers

The FAA has acknowledged a nationwide shortage of 3,000 air traffic controllers, with New York TRACON and LaGuardia among the most strained facilities. Chronic understaffing leads to:

• Excessive workload

• Fatigue

• Reduced situational awareness

• Increased stress

• Higher error rates

The National Transportation Safety Board (2017) has repeatedly warned that fatigue is a major contributor to aviation incidents. Fatigue is also recognized as a psychosocial hazard because it alters cognitive processing and increases the likelihood of errors.

ATC audio from the crash revealed confusion and distress

Publicly available ATC recordings from the LaGuardia crash show:

• A controller repeatedly telling the fire truck to stop, at least 10 times

• A controller later said, “I messed up.”

• Confusion about whether the fire truck had been cleared to cross the runway

This situation does not represent simply a communication failure. It is evidence of cognitive overload, stress, and role conflict, all psychosocial hazards that influence behavior under pressure.

A pattern of warnings that went unaddressed

Across all sources, a consistent pattern emerges:

• Repeated warnings from pilots

• Documented near‑misses

• ATC communication problems

• Operational pressure and high traffic volume

• Understaffing and fatigue

• Stress and cognitive overload

These are not isolated issues. They are systemic psychosocial hazards that shape the conditions in which people work and make decisions.

And they existed long before the aircraft and fire truck ever crossed paths.

Psychosocial Hazards Shape Human Behavior Long Before Harm Is Visible

Psychosocial hazards influence how people make decisions, how teams communicate, how leaders respond under pressure, how organizations prioritize safety, and how systems adapt, or fail to adapt, to changing conditions. When workers experience fear, confusion, overload, or lack of support, their behavior changes. They may take shortcuts, avoid reporting concerns, hesitate to ask for help, or disengage from safety practices.

These behavioral shifts accumulate over time, creating conditions where incidents become more likely. By the time a physical injury or operational failure occurs, the psychosocial harm has already been done. Research from NIOSH has long shown that psychosocial stressors degrade performance, impair judgment, and increase the likelihood of error (Sauter et al., 1990).

In high‑risk environments such as aviation and emergency response, these effects are magnified. Fatigue, for example, is a well‑documented contributor to degraded situational awareness and impaired decision‑making (NTSB, 2017). Stress and cognitive overload can cause responders to miss critical cues or misinterpret instructions (USFA, 2018).

Psychosocial hazards are not “soft” issues. They are operational risks.

Psychosocial Hazards Are Predictors of System Failure

Organizations often treat psychosocial hazards as matters of morale, culture, or interpersonal conflict. But in reality, they are leading indicators of system instability. Hopkins (2005) argues that organizational culture and psychosocial conditions are often the root causes of major disasters, even when the triggering event appears technical.

Role conflict, excessive workload, lack of support, harassment, discrimination, and poor communication are not merely interpersonal problems. They are structural weaknesses that degrade system performance. When these hazards are present, systems become brittle. When they accumulate, systems become vulnerable. When they are ignored, systems eventually fail. These realities are why modern safety science emphasizes understanding the organizational context surrounding incidents rather than focusing solely on frontline behavior (Stroeve et al., 2023).

Once an Incident Occurs, Psychosocial Hazards Become Harder to See

After an incident, attention shifts to what happened, who was involved, and how the organization responded. The psychosocial conditions that contributed to the event often fade into the background. Workers may be reluctant to speak openly. Leaders may become defensive. Documentation may be incomplete. Investigations tend to focus on visible failures rather than systemic contributors.

As Dekker (2014) notes, organizations often “drift into failure” gradually, through small compromises and accumulated pressures that become normalized. Once an incident occurs, those pressures are rarely visible to the public. If psychosocial hazards are not addressed before an incident, they become nearly invisible after one.

Prevention Protects People, and Protects Truth

When psychosocial hazards are managed proactively, workers feel safe reporting concerns, leaders receive accurate information, systems operate as designed, and incidents become less likely. And if an incident does occur, the organization can respond transparently. Prevention is not only about reducing harm. It is about ensuring that when harm does occur, the truth is accessible. The National Academies (2016) emphasize that transparency during crises depends on the quality of information systems and on organizational culture, established long before the crisis. Prevention is therefore a strategy for transparency, trust, and resilience

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Conclusion: The Future of Safety Depends on What We Do Before the Incident

The LaGuardia crash is a stark reminder that the moment of impact is never the beginning of the story. It is the end of a long chain of exposures, pressures, decisions, omissions, and systemic vulnerabilities. Psychosocial hazards, if addressed proactively, can change that story. They can reduce incidents, strengthen resilience, improve transparency, protect communities, and ensure that when something does go wrong, the truth is not lost in the chaos.

The moment before the moment matters.
It is where prevention lives.
It is where harm begins or is stopped.
And it is where the future of safety will be decided.

References

Dekker, S. (2014). The field guide to understanding ‘human error’ (3rd ed.). CRC Press.

Federal Aviation Administration. (2026). Human Factors in Aviation Safety (AVS).

Hopkins, A. (2005). Safety, culture, and risk: The organizational causes of disasters. CCH Australia.

International Labour Organization. (2020). Managing work‑related psychosocial risks during the COVID-19 pandemic.

National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. (2016). Communicating clearly about risks and crises.

National Transportation Safety Board. (2017). Reducing fatigue‑related accidents (Safety Alert SA‑070).

Reason, J. (1997). Managing the risks of organizational accidents. Ashgate.

Sauter, S. L., Murphy, L. R., & Hurrell, J. J. (1990). Prevention of work‑related psychological disorders: A national strategy proposed by NIOSH. American Psychologist, 45(10), 1146–1158.

Stroeve, S., Kirwan, B., Turan, O., et al. (2023). SHIELD human factors taxonomy and database for learning from aviation and maritime safety occurrences. Safety, 9(1), 14.

U.S. Fire Administration. (2018). Critical incident stress and firefighters.

World Health Organization. (2022). Mental health at work: Policy brief.